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Global Apathy and the Need for a New,
Cooperative International Refugee Response
Emily Gleichert
ABSTRACT
While an increasing number of nations move toward isolationist, nationalist
policies, the number of refugees worldwide is climbing to its highest levels since World
War II. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is the international
body tasked with protecting this population. However, the office’s traditional solutions for
refugees – local integration, resettlement in a third country, and voluntary repatriation –
have mostly eluded refugees who spend an average of twenty years in exile. The limitations
UNHCR’s structure imposes on the office, specifically in its ability to fund its operations
and compel nations to act, have contributed to its failure to effect durable solutions for
refugees. The Global Compact on Refugees, proposed by UNHCR and adopted by most
United Nations member states, seeks to address these structural limitations. Nonetheless,
the Global Compact on Refugees does not fundamentally alter the constraints that
currently prevent refugees from accessing durable solutions. The United Nations must
work collaboratively across its organs to craft a solution. Moving forward, the United
Nations Security Council should use its power under Chapter VII to create a centralized
tribunal for refugees that will harmonize protection for refugees, increase burden sharing
among nations, and facilitate a durable solution for refugees. The centralized tribunal will
only be possible if structured to give nations the correct incentives to buy in. However, if
there is successful buy in, the centralized tribunal may address the refugee crisis – and the
global apathy toward it – in ways UNHCR has not and cannot.
INTRODUCTION
“There are no humanitarian solutions to humanitarian problems.”1 —
Sadako Ogata, Former United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees



J.D. Candidate, Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, 2021. I am grateful for Professor Stephen Sawyer
whose class and guidance inspired this Note, the staff of the Northwestern Journal of Law and Social
Policy who provided thoughtful edits, and friends and family who supported me throughout the process.
1
No Refuge: Why the World’s Swelling Refugee Population Has Shrinking Options, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS, https://www.cfr.org/interactive/refugee-crisis/#!/a-system-under-strain (last visited Mar. 15,
2020); see also Vivian Tan, Ogata Calls for Stronger Political Will to Solve Refugee Crisis, UNHCR USA
(May 27, 2005), https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2005/5/4297406a2/ogata-calls-stronger-politicalsolve-refugee-crises.html.
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Sajad Jacob fled Afghanistan with his family when he was a young child to escape
violent persecution for being a Hazara, a Shia Muslim minority.2 He spent the next twenty
years of his life in an Indonesian detention center.3 The United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees rejected Sajad and his family’s application for recognition of refugee status
at least twice.4 Like Sajad, most of the other 14,000 asylum seekers in Indonesia live in
immigration-controlled housing with no access to work or education.5 With only 556
refugees resettled to a third country last year, refugees in Indonesia live with little hope.6
After nearly two decades in detention and limbo, Sajad passed away at twenty-four years
old after soaking himself in petrol and lighting himself on fire.7 John Arash Sedigh, an
Iranian Christian also seeking a permanent solution as a refugee while stuck in Indonesia,
said, “If there was hope, it would be better. But when there is no option to go back, to stay
as a human, or to get resettled, maybe we will all end it ourselves.”8
The number of refugees like Sajad and John recently reached its highest level
worldwide since the end of World War II.9 Yet the United States has cut the number of
spots available for refugee resettlement to a maximum of 18,000—the lowest number of
spots the United States has offered since 1980, the year the United States Refugee Act was
passed.10 Public attention is focused on attempts by developed countries (such as the United
States and members of the European Union) to retreat from refugee support,11 drawing
attention away from the fact that lesser developed countries host 84% of refugees
worldwide.12 As of March 2015, only 1% of global refugees were able to access
resettlement as a solution.13
This global migration crisis is occurring in part because international collaborative
bodies lack a durable solution for refugees.14 This Note will imagine a new role for
Ian Morse, ‘Open Prison’: The Growing Despair of Refugees Stuck in Indonesia, AL JAZEERA (Mar. 3,
2019), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/02/prison-growing-despair-refugees-stuck-indonesia190225055714272.html.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Jens Manuel Krogstad, Key Facts about Refugees to the U.S., PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Oct. 7, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/09/27/key-facts-about-refugees-to-the-u-s/.
10
Id. This figure is compared to the 110,000 spots for refugee resettlement set by the Obama administration
in fiscal year 2017 and the 232,000 spots for refugee resettlement in fiscal year 1980. Id.
11
Richard Hall, EU ‘Letting Refugees Die’ at Sea After Cancelling Mediterranean Rescue Missions, THE
INDEPENDENT (Mar. 28, 2019), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/eu-refugee-migrantcrisis-libya-mediterranean-rescue-missions-a8843556.html; see also Operational Portal: Mediterranean
Situation, U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean (last
visited Dec. 18, 2019) (120,426 refugees and migrants arriving in EU through Mediterranean sea route
through December 16, 2019).
12
Press Release, U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Resettlement is Critical Lifeline for Refugees and
Needs Strengthening (July 1, 2019), https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2019/7/5d19dd524/unhcrresettlement-critical-lifeline-refugees-needs-strengthening.html.
13
Office of Internal Oversight Serv., Rep. on the Evaluation of the Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for
Refugees, U.N. Doc. E/AC.51/2015/5 (Mar. 18, 2015).
14
“Filippo Gransi, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, said that there is a sense of an
overwhelming crisis, with refugees and migrants stigmatized in an unprecedented fashion. Traditional
responses to the global crisis have become increasingly inadequate, he noted…” Press Release, Security
2
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international collaborative institutions, specifically the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR), in addressing the global migrant crisis during a time of widespread
isolationist policies. Part I outlines the history and mandate of UNHCR and the boundaries
its structure imposes on the office. Part II examines UNHCR’s historical solutions for
refugees and discusses their viability as durable solutions in today’s geopolitical context.
Part III traces UNHCR’s current efforts to address shortcomings in the international
refugee regime, specifically the Global Compact and its potential successes and limitations.
Finally, Part IV proposes solutions to the refugee crisis that utilize the power of the United
Nations to act in the interest of international peace and security.
I. UNHCR MANDATE AND STRUCTURE
The United Nations General Assembly (General Assembly) created UNHCR in the
wake of World War II to “assume the function of providing international protection . . .
and of seeking permanent solutions for the problem of refugees.”15 In pursuit of this
mandate, UNHCR has implemented various protection strategies and expanded its role to
include non-refugee vulnerable populations as well. Nonetheless, the office has fallen short
in its pursuit of refugee protection. The structure of UNHCR and the agreements it monitors
limit UNHCR’s capacity to address global refugee needs in several important ways;
namely, UNHCR’s structure lacks both the funding and power to compel action necessary
to fulfill its mandate.
A. Mandate
In addition to the core mandate assigned by the General Assembly, UNHCR’s
mandate is rooted in international treaty law.16 Most notably, the 1951 Convention relating
to the Status of Refugees17 (1951 Convention) and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status
of Refugees 18 (1967 Protocol) oblige states who ratify the instruments to cooperate with
UNHCR in order to protect the rights of those fleeing persecution in their own country.19
The office of UNHCR acts as the “guardian” of these international agreements by

Council, Efforts to Tackle Global Displacement Crisis ‘Fragmented’, Refugee Agency Chief Tells Security
Council, Saying They Address Mere Symptoms, Not Root Causes, SC/13770 (Apr. 9, 2019),
https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/sc13770.doc.htm.
15
G.A. Res. 428 (V), annex, ¶ 1 (Dec. 14, 1950); see Div. of Internal Prot., Note on the Mandate of the
High Comm’r for Refugees and his Office (Oct. 2013) at 1, https://www.unhcr.org/enus/protection/basic/526a22cb6/mandate-high-commissioner-refugees-office.html [hereinafter Div. of
Internal Prot., Note on the Mandate].
16
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Apr. 22, 1954, S. TREATY DOC. No. 2545, 189 U.N.T.S.
137, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/ProtocolStatusOfRefugees.aspx
[perma.cc/F7YT-A9RR]; see Div. of Internal Prot., Note on the Mandate, supra note 15.
17
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 16. 145 states are party to the 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Notably, the United States was not a signatory to the 1951
Convention. Id.
18
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Oct. 4, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267,
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20V/V-5.en.pdf. The United States
was among the 146 states that ratified the 1967 Protocol. Id.
19
Div. of Internal Prot., Note on the Mandate, supra note 15.
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supervising their application in signatory countries.20 Presiding over the office of UNHCR
and this mandate is a High Commissioner for Refugees (High Commissioner), who is
elected by the General Assembly and serves a five-year term as the office’s
representative.21
At its inception, the 1951 Convention restricted UNHCR’s working definition of
refugee to those of European descent affected by events prior to 1951. This restriction
aimed to address the plight of those affected by World War II.22 The 1967 Protocol
modified the definition to cover “all persons outside their country of origin for reasons of
feared persecution, conflict, generalized violence, or other circumstances that have
seriously disturbed public order and who, as a result, require international protection.”23
The core mandate of UNHCR was meant to encompass advocacy for the rights of these
defined refugees and asylum seekers, returnees, and stateless people.24 Over the years,
however, UNHCR has taken on a broader role in the protection of vulnerable populations
not traditionally within its mandate. 25 Notably, the General Assembly has authorized
UNHCR to assist internally displaced people and those requiring assistance through
UNHCR’s “good offices.”26
B. Funding Structure
UNHCR’s mandate to protect refugees and find a solution to the refugee problem
is not political. However, its job is inherently political. Making decisions about who is a
refugee and how they should be protected are value-laden political judgments. Recently
UNHCR chastised the United States for its policy barring refugees from entering if they
have not applied for asylum in a country they passed through on their journey to the United
States (third-country transit ban).27 By doing so, UNHCR entered the political arena by
opposing the United States’ political judgment about who it would consider a refugee at its
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 16; see also U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees,
The 1951 Refugee Convention, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/1951-refugee-convention.html (last visited
Dec. 18, 2019).
21
The High Commissioner, UNHCR, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/the-highcommissioner.html#:~:text=%E2%80%9CUNHCR%20is%20navigating%20extraordinarily%20difficult%
20waters.&text=Filippo%20Grandi%20is%20the%2011th,term%2C%20until%2031%20December%2020
20 (last visited Nov. 5, 2020).
22
Joel Glasman, Seeing Like a Refugee Agency: A Short History of UNHCR Classifications in Central
Africa, 30 J. OF REFUGEE STUDIES 337, 341 (2017); The 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 20.
23
Div. of Internal Prot., Note on the Mandate, supra note 15; However, UNHCR’s mandate did not, nor
does not contemplate “persons whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period 1 June
1946 to 15 May 1948, and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict.”
That population falls under the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the
Near East. See U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, Palestine Refugees,
https://www.unrwa.org/palestine-refugees (last visited Dec. 18, 2019).
24
Div. of Internal Prot., Note on the Mandate, supra note 15; see also G.A. Res. 428 (V) (Dec. 14, 1950).
25
Div. of Internal Prot., Note on the Mandate, supra note 15; see also Gil Loescher, UNHCR’s Origins and
Early History: Agency, Influence, and Power in Global Refugee Policy, 33 REFUGE 77, 81 (2017)
(“Western governments were willing politically and financially to support UNHCR’s operational expansion
into the developing world, because international action on the refugee issue was also now viewed as a way
to deal with both a growing humanitarian issue and a potentially significant source of instability in the
Global South.”).
26
Rep. of the U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, U.N. Doc. A/4771/Rev.1 (Jan. 1, 1962).
27
Id.
20
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borders. Although this criticism is unlikely to influence the United States’ current
administration,28 advocacy by High Commissioners has been an effective tool for UNHCR
under some circumstances.29 For example, when thousands of Haitians were fleeing their
homes in boats only to be forcibly returned by the United States, UNHCR stepped in with
outright criticism, which eventually led to a reversal of the controversial policy.30 This type
of persuasive political advocacy can be an asset for UNHCR even though the United
Nations imagined a nonpolitical role for the office.
However, UNHCR’s funding structure is in tension with its role as a political
advocate. The mandate of UNHCR designates that “all [non-administrative] activities of
the High Commissioner through his Office are to be financed through voluntary
contributions.”31 In 2018, UNHCR received “$2.3B of the $8.2B it needed for its annual
program.”32 In the same year, nearly 40% of the agency’s budget came from the United
States’ contributions.33 UNHCR’s reliance on one country (or a small subset of countries)
for a large stream of funding could influence some High Commissioners to be more careful
or reticent in their criticism of that country.34 Accordingly, UNHCR’s budget deficit
undermines the independence and efficacy of the agency, as does the fact that much of its
funding comes from states the agency seeks to police.35

28

Maggie Haberman, A President Who Believes He Is Entitled to His Own Facts, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/18/us/politics/donald-trump-foreign-leaders.html.
29
U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Evaluation of Effectiveness and Relevance of Advocacy Approaches
with the EU and in EU/EFTA Countries, at 4-5, U.N. Doc. ES/2019/01 (2019),
https://www.unhcr.org/5d09f6fd7.pdf.
30
Robert Suro, U.N. Refugee Agency Says U.S. Violates Standards in Repatriating Haitians, WASH. POST
(Jan. 11, 1995) https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/01/11/un-refugee-agency-says-usviolates-standards-in-repatriating-haitians/fa5fd302-4cba-4169-aac0-3b751ae84f63/.
31
Div. of Internal Prot., Note on the Mandate, supra note 15; “It may be ironic that at times states provide
support to the agency so that it [UNHCR] can then lobby states to change their policies and so that it can
criticize states for having inappropriate policies.” David Forsythe, UNHCR’s Mandate: The Politics of
Being Non-political 3-4 (New Issues in Refugee Research, Working Paper No. 33),
https://www.unhcr.org/3ae6a0d08.pdf.
32
Jeff Crisp, As the World Abandons Refugees, UNHCR’s Constraints are Exposed, REFUGEES DEEPLY
(Sept. 13, 2018) https://www.newsdeeply.com/refugees/community/2018/09/13/as-the-world-abandonsrefugees-unhcrs-constraints-are-exposed.
33
Id.
34
UNHCR has publicly rebuked the E.U. for failing to improve the situation of migrants in Libya but has
remained quiet about the E.U.’s role in intercepting and returning refugees trying to leave Libya by boat.
Crisp, supra note 32. The European Union is UNHCR’s second biggest donor. It and four of its member
states made up half of UNHCR’s top ten government donors in 2018. Donors, UNHCR,
https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/donors.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2020).
35
Donors, UNHCR, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/donors.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2020); Conversely, the
power of states to influence UNHCR action can be an important monitor on the agency, as it was when
Germany and the UK withheld funds from UNHCR Uganda for fraud and corruption. Though for good
cause in this instance, it makes clear that states view withholding of funds as a tool for influencing agency
action. Samuel Okiror, Key Donors Freeze Uganda Refugee Aid After UN Mismanagement Scandal, THE
NEW HUMANITARIAN (Feb. 28, 2019), http://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2019/02/28/donorsfreeze-uganda-refugee-aid-after-un-mismanagement-scandal.
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C. Tools to Compel Action
World leaders’ receptivity to UNHCR’s persuasive pressure also limits UNHCR’s
political influence, the agency’s main tool to encourage action.36 For example, though
UNHCR rebuked the United States’ third-country transit ban,37 UNHCR cannot compel
the United States to change policies or take action.38 In fact, its only real power—bad
publicity—has not changed the United States’ stance on the issue.39 Thus, UNHCR’s
power to compel action through shaming is a limited one that relies on world leaders’
receptivity.40
The growth in states’ own sophisticated legal systems further limits UNHCR’s
persuasive power. As a temporary specialized agency of the United Nations, the
International Refugee Organization dealt with European WWII refugees from 1946 to
1952. 41 At UNHCR’s inception, the entire legal unit at the International Refugee
Organization moved to UNHCR. This gave the agency institutional knowledge and
capacity at a time when member states did not have the requisite level of expertise to
contradict UNHCR legal practice and policy.42 However, since then, many states have
developed their own legal expertise.43 Consequently, many of these states now have the
36

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 16; Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees, Oct. 4, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267,
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20V/V-5.en.pdf; see also Forsythe,
supra note 31 at 16 (“UNHCR has nothing more, usually, than the capability to engage in persuasion based
on norms of its mandate, and its reputation for action faithful to its mandate.”).
37
Press Release, U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR Deeply Concerned About New U.S.
Asylum Restrictions (July 15, 2019), https://reliefweb.int/report/united-states-america/unhcr-deeplyconcerned-about-new-us-asylum-restrictions.
38
G.A. Res. 428 (V) Art. 8 (Dec. 14, 1950). UNHCR can act on its mandate by: “Promoting the conclusion
and ratification of international conventions for the protection of refugees, supervising their application and
proposing amendments thereto; promoting through special agreements with governments the execution of
any measures calculated to improve the situation of refugees and to reduce the number requiring protection;
assisting governmental and private efforts to promote voluntary repatriation or assimilation within new
national communities; promoting the admission of refugees, not excluding those in the most destitute
categories, to the territories of States; endeavoring to obtain permission for refugees to transfer their assets
and especially those necessary for their resettlement; obtaining from governments information concerning
the number and conditions of refugees in their territories and the laws and regulations concerning them;
keeping in close touch with the governments and inter-governmental organizations concerned; establishing
contact in such manner as [it] may think best with private organizations dealing with refugee questions;
facilitating the coordination of the efforts of private organizations concerned with the welfare of refugees.”
39
See Muzaffar Chishti & Sarah Pierce, Despite Trump Invitation to Stop Taking Refugees, Red and Blue
States Alike Endorse Resettlement, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE. (Jan. 29, 2020),
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/despite-trump-invitation-stop-taking-refugees-red-and-blue-statesalike-endorse-resettlement (“In November, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) began deporting
asylum seekers to Guatemala under an asylum cooperation agreement (ACA) signed with the Guatemalan
government last July. . . So far, the United States has sent more than 300 migrants from Honduras and El
Salvador, including many children, to Guatemala.”).
40
“Condemnation from the outside is rarely effective for leaders who scorn the international system.” Sarah
Deardorff Miller, Xenophobia Toward Refugee and Other Forced Migrants 5 (World Refugee Council
Research Paper No. 5, 2018),
https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/documents/WRC%20Research%20Paper%20no.5.pdf.
41
Constitution of the International Refugee Organization, Dec. 15, 1946, 18 U.N.T.S. 283.
42
Loescher, supra note 25, at 84.
43
Id.
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capacity to create alternative policies countering those UNHCR issues. Even if UNHCR
condemns a state’s refugee policies in an attempt to compel compliance with the 1951 and
1967 refugee agreements, the state may argue a different interpretation.44 For example,
UNHCR deemed the United States’ third-country transit ban a violation of international
law. However, the United States is free to argue it is not, and UNHCR has no recourse.45
Since UNHCR relies on states to give effect to its recommendations and interpretations,
and has no power to compel compliance, a state’s divergent interpretation of the legal
agreement undermines the efficacy of UNHCR.
II. INABILITY OF UNHCR TO FULFILL ITS MANDATE IN THE MODERN ERA
UNHCR’s structural limitations, in both funding and compelling action, prevent
many refugees from accessing a durable solution in the modern era. Traditionally, UNHCR
relied on three solutions: voluntary repatriation, resettlement to a third country, or local
integration.46 The current length of refugees’ exile, however, illustrates UNHCR’s failure
to implement these solutions with success in today’s geopolitical context. 47 At the end of
2011, 75% of refugees under UNHCR’s mandate were living in a protracted refugee
situation.48 It is estimated that refugees spend an average of twenty years in exile, meaning
they have not been voluntarily repatriated, locally integrated, or resettled.49 This Part
discusses why UNHCR’s traditional solutions have not been viable options for a majority
of refugees. It then discusses how UNHCR has attempted to carry out its protection
mandate for those refugees who have not accessed a durable solution.
Local integration of refugees has failed as a solution for several reasons. As
democracy emerged in states who host the vast majority of refugees,50 it became harder for
governments to defend providing more services to refugees than those available for
citizens.51 States also became concerned about security. States feared the possibility that a
44

American Courts and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees: A Need for Harmony in the Face of a
Refugee Crisis, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1399, 1408 (Mar. 2018),
https://harvardlawreview.org/2018/03/american-courts-and-the-u-n-high-commissioner-for-refugees-aneed-for-harmony-in-the-face-of-a-refugee-crisis/.
45
This argument between legal interpretations plays out in the court of public opinion. Jasmine Aguilera,
Trump’s New Restrictions on Asylum Seekers Violate U.S. and International Law, Experts Say, TIME (July
24, 2019 1:21 PM), https://time.com/5626498/trump-asylum-rule-international-law/.
46
GIL LOESCHER ET AL., THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR): THE
POLITICS AND PRACTICE OF REFUGEE PROTECTION INTO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, 110-11 (Thomas G.
Weiss & Rorden Wilkinson eds., 2008).
47
The Palestinian refugee situation provides an apt example. Though the United Nations Relief and Works
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, an organ closely related to UNHCR, has been in existence
since 1949, there are still five million people living under its auspice in 2019 and nearly one-third of that
population lives in refugee camps. G.A. Res. 302(IV) (Dec. 8, 1949); U.N. Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East, Palestine Refugees, https://www.unrwa.org/palestine-refugees (last
visited Dec. 18, 2019).
48
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF REFUGEE AND FORCED MIGRATION STUDIES, 153 (Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh
et al. eds., 2014).
49
Id.
50
U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018,
https://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2018/, (last visited Dec. 18, 2019). Eighty-four percent of refugees are
hosted in “lesser developed” states, often those bordering the conflict region from which refugees flee. Id.
51
Loescher, supra note 46, at 114; Steven Erlanger & Kimiko de Freytas-Tamura, U.N. Funding Shortfalls
and Cuts in Refugee Aid Fuel Exodus to Europe, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2015),
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large influx of refugees could bring with them racial, ethnic, or religious tensions, or
exacerbate existing tensions in the country by changing regional or national demographics
with their presence.52 Even today, shifting attitudes around hosting immigrants drive state
decisions on local integration.53 For example, Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel
demonstrated strong commitment to integrating migrants into German society. However,
she changed positions in a politically expedient deal after several high profile assaults
involving migrants turned public sentiment.54 As a result, instead of absorbing migrants
into German society, new border camps for asylum seekers are being built.55 When
movement of refugees is controlled in this way, it undermines refugees’ freedom to
integrate into local communities in a host country.56 State resistance to local integration is
one of the causes of protracted refugee situations which proliferate the refugee experience
today.
UNHCR’s limited ability to compel action undermines its ability to incentivize
states to integrate refugees into local communities. Due to its protection mandate, UNHCR
now acts as the main provider for refugees who have not been able to access local
integration (or resettlement or repatriation) as solutions.57 This disincentivizes host
countries from crafting long term solutions because they can shrug off the burden of
providing for refugees within their borders.58 The provision of basic needs is a necessary
humanitarian function that UNHCR has taken on in order to fulfill its mandate to protect
refugees.59 It would be contrary to UNHCR’s protection mandate to not fill the gap left by
states who are unwilling or unable to provide basic needs to refugees. However, the current
system allows states to shirk responsibility for refugees because UNHCR acts as a safety
net for those refugees. Ultimately, the current system fails to provide local integration for
refugees as a durable solution.
Resettlement to a third country – one that is not the refugee’s native country or the
country to which he or she fled – implicates the same structural limitation on UNHCR’s
ability to compel action. Wealthier countries are not inclined to open their borders to
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/20/world/un-funding-shortfalls-and-cuts-in-refugee-aid-fuel-exodus-toeurope.html (“About 70 percent of registered Syria refugees living in Lebanon, for example, are below the
poverty line, creating tensions with local inhabitants for jobs and health services…host communities [are]
seeing their populations double or triple, straining health services and infrastructure and creating
competition for jobs while driving down wages.”).
52
Loescher, supra note 46, at 113-14.
53
Katrin Bennhold & Melissa Eddy, Merkel, to Survive, Agrees to Border Camps for Migrants, N.Y. TIMES
(July 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/02/world/europe/angela-merkel-migrationcoalition.html; see also Beth Elise Whitaker, Funding the International Refugee Regime: Implications for
Protection, 14 GLOB. GOVERNANCE 241 (2008).
54
Bennhold & Eddy, supra note 53.
55
Id.
56
Loescher, supra note 46, at 113-14; Whitaker, supra note 53, at 251 (“In response both to rising crime
rates and repeated accusations by Burundi that the camps were harboring rebels, Tanzanian officials placed
severe limitations on refugee movement and other activities. In most areas, the ‘four kilometer rule’ was
strictly enforced, limiting the distance that refugees could stray from camp. Because most camps were at
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refugee resettlement.60 The most UNHCR can do to facilitate relocation is lobby these
countries to accept larger numbers of refugees through their resettlement programs.61
Again, success relies on the receptivity of world leaders to UNHCR’s pleas and pressure.
Additionally, these lobbying efforts are often directed at the countries who UNHCR relies
upon for funding, creating tension between UNHCR’s nonpolitical and advocacy roles.62
UNHCR must also navigate differing interests in resettlement that create tension
between funding countries and hosting countries. Funding countries, such as the United
States, desire a policy of containment.63 Instead of offering or facilitating asylum for
refugees in their own country, funders desire refugees to be “contained” in their country of
origin.64 One reporter illustrates this desire for containment: “Wealthier countries are
making increasingly severe efforts to keep out the uninvited: in 1990, according to research
by geographer Reece Jones, 15 countries had walls or fences on their border; by the
beginning of 2016, that number had risen to almost 70.”65 UNHCR must balance these
funders’ interest in keeping refugees out, which limits resettlement, with host countries’
desire to keep refugees contained, which precludes local integration.66
Voluntary repatriation is also an elusive solution for most refugees. The nature of
conflicts which drive refugees from their countries is changing. In the past, refugees fled
their countries due to government persecution. Today, refugees are fleeing their countries
due to independent armed groups such as Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant or Boko
Haram.67 UNHCR, which only has influence over nation states, holds no bargaining
position with these armed groups. Therefore, it has no means to facilitate peace that would
provide an opportunity for a refugee to voluntarily return to their home country.68
60
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In search of durable solutions, UNHCR has adapted its strategy for meeting its
protection mandate by changing its conception of protection over the years. At its
inception, UNHCR provided juridical advice, such as distributing travel documents,
granting residence permits, and assisting refugees in obtaining legal status from states.69
At this time, UNHCR viewed the mandate of protection as a legal task.70 Due to this view,
protection was closely tied to the traditional solution of resettlement.
Several decades after its creation, UNHCR linked “material aid” to its protection
mandate.71 Instead of simply taking care of refugees’ legal needs, the agency argued that
African states would accept refugees and care for them if they were given material aid to
do so.72 As a result, UNHCR started providing refugees with tools and seeds in exchange
for their work on host country development projects, equating protection with selfsufficiency and integration.73 This strategy closely aligned with the traditional solution of
local integration.
Today, the increasing number of refugees paired with countries’ increasing
reluctance to host refugees has eliminated UNHCR’s ability to provide refugees with
resources that enable work and eventual land acquisition.74 Instead, refugee settlements
have turned into emergency sites where UNHCR provides basic needs like food to stranded
refugees.75 Ultimately, UNHCR now fulfills its protection mandate with this basic needs
provision instead of legal mobility and self-sufficiency. Although the basic needs provision
contributes to problems with the traditional solutions, UNHCR must fill this essential
human rights role as the United Nations’ organ for refugee protection.
III. A NEW APPROACH TO PROTECTING REFUGEES
Recognizing the current state of refugee affairs required change, the General
Assembly tasked the High Commissioner with proposing a new Global Compact on
Refugees.76 The General Assembly tasked the High Commissioner with this responsibility
in the 2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, in which all 193 member
states agreed to share responsibility for refugee protection.77 The General Assembly
adopted the Global Compact on Refugees (Global Compact) in 2018 after a two-year
consultation process led by UNHCR.78 Notably, the United States did not adopt the Global
Compact.79 The Global Compact provides a framework for global responsibility sharing of
refugee support.80 It outlines four key objectives to accomplish the goal of moving away
69
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from a refugee camp model: easing pressures on host countries, enhancing refugee selfreliance, expanding access to third-country solutions, and supporting conditions in the
countries of origin for return in safety and dignity.81
The Global Compact represents a global recognition that the international refugee
system requires change. It also attempts to address limitations discussed above, such as
UNHCR’s funding and limited tools for compelling action. The Global Compact outlines
a “global arrangement for international cooperation,” which calls for a Global Refugee
Forum every four years.82 The Global Compact declares that the Global Refugee Forum
will serve as an opportunity for member states and stakeholders to convene and announce
pledges and contributions.83 Notably, the Global Refugee Forum may provide an
opportunity for a donation in the public eye, or it may include different stakeholders who
can act as funders in coming years.84 Ultimately, the Global Refugee Forum may even
increase UNHCR’s persuasive power by shining a light on the plight of refugees. The
spotlight could give UNHCR an additional opportunity to both exert pressure on nations to
act and to frame public action as supportive of a state’s interest in becoming (or remaining)
a politically valuable player on the global stage.85
The Global Compact also addresses local integration in lesser developed countries,
which has been stymied by local government resistance to providing social services to
refugees.86 It calls for the refugee’s needs—such as education, jobs, and health—to be met
by a system in which host country nationals can benefit as well. This new system would
replace the existing parallel system in which refugee services are provided separately from
local services.87 The new system may address host countries’ resistance to being the service
provider for refugees; if local populations are also benefiting from services, it will become
politically viable to provide those services. It may even address host countries’ security
concerns by ameliorating tensions between locals and refugee populations; xenophobic
sentiments born of “us” versus “them” diminish when one group does not feel as if the
other is taking what is “theirs.”88 At the very least, the Global Compact moves the
conversation surrounding refugees’ basic needs forward by raising the issue of social
services for residents and refugees alike.
However, the Global Compact fails to resolve UNHCR’s funding and action
problems.89 The Global Compact will not change the funding mechanisms that have created
a $6 billion deficit in UNHCR’s budget.90 Although the Global Refugee Forum will
provide a designated call for donations, the voluntary nature of the contributions does not
meaningfully shift the funding paradigm. Nation states are still free to fund refugee
Id.; Press Release, UN News, UN Affirms ‘Historic’ Global Compact to Support World’s Refugees, UN
NEWS (Dec. 17, 2018), https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/12/1028791.
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protection and solutions at their discretion.91 Therefore, the underlying problem remains
the same. Without new incentives, funders will still rely heavily on lesser developed
countries to bear the burden of refugee settlement, while lesser developed countries will
still rely heavily on UNHCR for the care and maintenance of refugee populations, the
combination of which has led to protracted refugee situations. Local integration may be
more palatable for host countries under the Global Compact if UNCHR and funders
provide adequate support. However, the voluntary nature of funding and lack of new
incentives will perpetuate the cycle that exists now; “so long as UNHCR is the main
provider of assistance in camps, states are able to defer considering long-term solutions to
protracted refugee situations.”92 Thus, UNHCR will continue to be the main provider for
refugees who increasingly lack durable solutions.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO PROTRACTED REFUGEE SITUATIONS
The United Nations Security Council (Security Council) should use its power under
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to declare the current refugee crisis a threat to
international peace and security. This will allow the Security Council to create a centralized
tribunal that can manage refugee resettlement for the benefit of all parties, particularly the
five permanent Security Council Members (P5).93 Section A will address where the
Security Council gets authority for such an action. Section B will discuss a model for the
operation of a centralized tribunal created by the Security Council. Finally, Section C will
propose incentives for Security Council members with a veto to approve such an expansive
use of Security Council power.
A. UN Security Council Authority to Create a Tribunal
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter empowers the Security Council “to
determine the existence of any threat to the peace . . . [and] make recommendations, or
decide what measures shall be taken . . . to maintain or restore international peace and
security.”94 The words “any threat” depict a broad grant of power. The rest of Chapter VII
continues the use of deferential language with phrases like “as [the Security Council]
deems necessary or desirable.”95 Without limiting language, there is ample room to
determine what is necessary or desirable. Though the articles in the Chapter are structured
to increase action incrementally, there is no indication that the action available to the
Security Council has a limit.96
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Under the auspice of this broad grant of power in Chapter VII, the Security Council
could find that the refugee crisis presents a threat to “the peace.” There are now almost
seventy-one million people displaced worldwide.97 The movement of almost seventy-one
million people from their homes creates the opportunity for smuggling, for human rights
abuses of vulnerable populations, for food and land shortages in neighboring countries, and
for armed groups’ recruitment of desperate people.98 In fact, various bodies of the United
Nations have explicitly recognized that refugee movement is a threat to international peace
and security, which is the prerequisite for Chapter VII action. 99 Furthermore, the Security
Council itself has previously considered the instability refugees cause surrounding
countries when authorizing unilateral intervention pursuant to its Chapter VII powers.100
Thus, the Security Council could reasonably find that the current refugee crisis presents a
threat to the peace that authorizes Chapter VII action.
Pursuant to its Chapter VII powers, the Security Council should find the current
refugee crisis a threat to international peace and security and pass a resolution creating a
centralized tribunal. The Security Council could design this tribunal to create a structure
for refugee processing, allocate responsibility among nation states, serve as a means of
financing, and force burden sharing by evenly distributing and processing refugee
assistance across nations. The tribunal would address two limitations of the Global
Compact: first, it would provide a mechanism to compel states to comply or submit to a
burden shifting buy out; and second, it would provide funding for UNHCR.
The Security Council’s creation of a tribunal is not unprecedented, nor are the
obligations that such an action would impose on member states. In 1993 the Security
Council authorized the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) to address past violations of international humanitarian law. 101 Like
ICTY, the creation of a centralized tribunal for refugees would also deal with international
U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Figures at a Glance, U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES,
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humanitarian law, albeit outside of the criminal context.102 Additionally, the Security
Council has imposed new obligations on States pursuant to its Chapter VII powers to
address international peace and security.103 For example, Security Council Resolution 1373
(Resolution 1373) created uniform counter-terrorism obligations that are binding on all
member states. Previous international counterterrorism conventions only bound states who
became parties to these conventions.104 Resolution 1373, however, went beyond the prior
norm by imposing obligations on all member states. Among other obligations, Resolution
1373 requires affirmative state action to criminalize terrorism financing, freeze terrorists’
assets, improve border security, exchange information concerning terrorists with other
states, and provide judicial assistance to other states in terrorism-related criminal
proceedings.105 The Security Council could look to this precedent as support for creating a
centralized tribunal.
B. Using the Common European Asylum System as a Model
As a baseline, a centralized tribunal for refugees could use the Common European
Asylum System (CEAS) as a model. CEAS sets asylum procedure standards and
harmonizes the grounds for international protection in asylum decisions in the European
Union.106 With the Dublin Regulation, another European Union refugee law, CEAS also
establishes criteria for determining which member state is responsible for an application
for international protection.107 Implemented in 2013, the current Dublin Regulation
considers a number of factors (such as family considerations, recent possession of a visa
or residence permit in a member state, or type of entrance into the European Union) to
determine which state has responsibility for an applicant.108 Although CEAS does not have
a centralized tribunal that hears and processes asylum cases of refugees, it does act as a
central refugee scheme for European Union member states.
Proposed in 2016, the fourth iteration of the Dublin Regulation provides the most
useful example of state burden sharing in a centralized scheme. The proposal includes a
fairness allocation mechanism that accounts for burdens on a nation’s immigration system
and the nation’s efforts to resettle those in need of international protection.109 Based on
country size and wealth, the new scheme would determine when a country handles a
102
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disproportionate number of asylum applications and redistribute any new applications to
other member states.110 Under the proposal, if a member state did not want to take part in
the reallocation of refugees, then it could make a set contribution to the member state who
receives the application instead.111
A centralized tribunal would facilitate the cooperative goals of CEAS on a global
scale and to a greater extent than is possible with more than twenty individual national
systems. The centralized tribunal on refugees would hear asylum cases, make decisions
about refugees’ statuses, and then allocate refugees fairly across nations. Critics may
contend that a centralized tribunal could not economically or procedurally manage the
millions of global refugee cases. However, the centralized tribunal would eliminate the
inefficiency of having numerous different asylum systems. In fact, wealthy countries spend
nearly $20 billion each to run their own domestic refugee systems.112 A centralized tribunal
would eliminate the necessity for domestic systems, and a central scheme’s cost of
assessment, relocation, and support “could easily be funded” for less than that.113
Therefore, a centralized tribunal would not only unify and create a more equitable and
stable asylum system, but it would also unburden nations’ own systems.114 This creates
value for nation states and could incentivize states to buy in and support the new system.
Additionally, the centralized tribunal would harmonize protection for refugees by
hearing asylum cases based on a set of procedures applied uniformly to all refugees. Right
now, refugees are subject to the disparate application of procedure based on the nation or
current administration of the nation to which they are able to flee. Again, the United States’
third-country transit ban provides an apt example. UNHCR deemed the third-country
transit ban a violation of international law, so the refugees subject to the policy will not
receive the same protection under international asylum law as those who are not subject to
it.115 A centralized tribunal would ensure that refugees would receive the same procedural
treatment no matter which border they were able to reach, thus eliminating this disparate
treatment created by individual nation states’ policy choices or legal interpretations. By
deciding refugees’ cases, the centralized tribunal would also be able to apply uniform
standards for asylum qualification. Lastly, the centralized tribunal would allocate refugees
for resettlement fairly across nations, the ethical implications of which will be explored in
the next Section. Allocating refugees according to a nation’s ability to host would
ameliorate the strain on countries who currently host many refugees with too few resources.
C. Incentivizing P5 Nations to Create a Centralized Tribunal
Any one of the P5 nations can block Security Council action under Chapter VII by
veto.116 It seems likely that at least one of the P5 members will resist being bound by a
central system that more evenly distributes protection for refugees among member states.
Although the United States claims that its third-country transit ban arises out of an overly
110
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burdened national system,117 which a centralized tribunal could ameliorate, the United
States is unlikely to agree to relinquish its own control over the refugee resettlement
process.118 Additionally, the United Kingdom is undergoing an exit from the European
Union prompted by fears of immigration,119 making it unlikely the United Kingdom will
agree to be bound to serve migrants. Therefore, the creation of a centralized tribunal for
refugee cases will not pass unless the United Nations first finds the right incentives for P5
countries, such as the United States and Britain, to submit to the jurisdiction and operating
terms of such a tribunal.
Any centralized tribunal for refugees will rely on resettlement to implement the
burden- sharing mechanism imagined by a central scheme. The Global Compact makes
resettlement an important tool by stating: “Apart from being a tool for protection of and
solutions for refugees, resettlement is also a tangible mechanism for burden- and
responsibility-sharing and a demonstration of solidarity, allowing States to help share each
other’s burdens and reduce the impact of large refugee situations on host countries.”120
However, the Global Compact does not address how to make resettlement palatable to
countries who have expressed policies contrary to the ethos of burden-sharing. This is a
fundamental shortcoming that any new proposal must address because a resolution will not
pass without all the P5 nations’ approval.
To incentivize subjection to a centralized tribunal for refugees, the United Nations
could credit nation states who voluntarily increase the number of refugee spots available
for resettlement in their country. The difficulty with this proposal is in assessing what kind
of credit would compel nation states to shift from short term investment in refugee
protection, which leads to basic services and refugee camps, to the long-term investment
of resettlement. This Note proposes that this credit could take one of two forms, monetary
or reputational, but would ideally adopt aspects of both.
1. Reputational Credits
In partnership with UNHCR, the tribunal could implement a reputational “credit”
with both the “naming and shaming” mechanism used in international human rights law
and the “virtuous circle” mechanism contemplated in international agreements such as the
Paris Agreement of 2015. At the Global Refugee Forum every four years, though
preferably more often, the High Commissioner could praise countries who made
substantial commitments to resettling refugees within their borders. By highlighting the
good behavior of countries and praising them for it on the world stage, the High
Commissioner could incentivize others to implement similar refugee protection policies in
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order to join the ranks of favored, “virtuous” countries.121 This may be especially important
for countries that are similarly situated, or competitors on the world stage. For example, if
China and the United States each want to be regarded as the best in the world, as we have
seen them strive for in the past, recognizing the other’s high achievements may spur on the
remaining country.
While the High Commissioner is praising countries who have surpassed
expectations, he or she may call out countries who have fallen short of the global refugee
protection goals. This is colloquially referred to as the “naming and shaming” mechanism
in the international human rights context. Studies have shown that shaming from the
foreign community can have a large reputational effect and invoke response from
governments.122 Past experience demonstrates the efficacy of this technique. For example,
China was sharply criticized for its involvement in Sudan and its implicit abetting of the
genocide in Darfur in the lead up to China’s hosting of the 2008 Olympics.123 An
international campaign to brand the 2008 Olympics as “The Genocide Olympics” was
effective in causing China to change its position and apply pressure on Sudan to allow
United Nations peacekeepers to be admitted to Darfur.124 Thus, naming and shaming can
create political will if a government feels that the global community, and more importantly,
its own citizens, are viewing its actions poorly.
Naming and shaming, however, cannot stand alone since it perpetuates the same
limitations on compelling action that UNHCR currently faces. The High Commissioner
already holds persuasive power over countries and uses it to express dissatisfaction with
member states. For example, the High Commissioner addressed the United States’ recent
decrease of refugee resettlement spots to 18,000 by stating that “UNHCR is naturally
troubled by this trend in the United States and elsewhere.”125 Despite UNHCR’s “shaming”
of the United States for several refugee policy changes over the last several years, the
United States has not shifted its position.126 This demonstrates the weakness of the current
system that relies solely on persuasive power. As discussed above, its efficacy is subject to
121
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the strength with which a High Commissioner pursues political advocacy and the
receptivity with which a nation’s leader receives it. Therefore, a system based purely on
reputational credit does not address UNHCR’s existing limitations.
2. Monetary Credits
A monetary credit could be slightly more difficult to implement because it requires
a plan for raising the necessary funds. It also presents the problem, if the incentive is
neutral, of overcompensating developed nations and under compensating developing
nations for supporting refugees. This Section proposes two different systems to address
these issues. Both systems would attempt to accomplish the essential function of giving the
P5 (and other influential, wealthy nations likely to oppose a centralized tribunal for
refugees) an out, or a veto on the system.
In the first proposed system, UNHCR could coordinate with the centralized tribunal
to create a system in which a global fund doles out monetary incentives on a graduated
scale for the receipt of refugees. To create the graduated scale, each nation would designate
how many refugees it believed its infrastructure and services could handle. For example,
the current United States administration has set that number at 18,000, citing the high
burden on the United States immigration system at this time.127 Whether the number is
actually related to a nation’s capacity to support refugees may be subject to the naming and
shaming mechanism described above. Once the number is set, UNHCR could offer a
monetary amount for every refugee resettled in the country above the quota.
This model poses several drawbacks, however. First, a monetary incentive must be
calibrated to deal with the wealth disparity of nations. Monetary incentives are likely to be
attractive to developing nations. However, they are unlikely to persuade more developed
nations to accept more refugees within their borders because they do not need that money.
Therefore, this regime would still fail to incentivize burden-sharing among the countries
most poised to support refugees. Second, this system also poses the risk that countries will
set their quota number low in order to receive money for those they receive over that
number. In that case, the number would not reflect a nation’s actual ability to support
refugees. As a solution, UNHCR could set a number for each nation. However, without
any additional provisions that allow a nation to work around that number, it is likely to fail
with the P5. Finally, this system does not solve the funding problem UNHCR currently
experiences, nor does it solve where the money to dole out incentives would come from.
If the incentive system were implemented despite its potential shortcomings, data
promulgation and advocacy could naturally address some nations’ reticence to burden
share. Data shows that there are economic incentives to having refugees resettle in a nation.
For example, in the United States, “refugees brought in $63 billion more in government
revenues over the past decade than they cost.”128 If the money in the global refugee fund,
discussed below, was used to expand refugees’ capacity to integrate and contribute to
society, and if this narrative was reproduced instead of the one which currently labels
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refugees as burdens on infrastructure, then nations may become more receptive to hosting
through a natural process over time.
In the second proposed system, the centralized tribunal, in partnership with UNHCR,
could designate how many refugees each nation should be compelled to take by an
indicator like gross domestic product. Another possible indicator could be the interaction
of a country’s wealth and size, the indicator that CEAS uses.129 The tribunal could compel
adherence through fines incurred by nations for noncompliance, payable to the centralized
tribunal for refugees or the global refugee fund discussed below. These fines would operate
similarly to economic sanctions authorized in Article forty-one of the Charter and would
have to be approved by the P5.130
UNHCR and the centralized tribunal for refugees could also calculate the cost of
resettling the quota number of refugees for each nation in addition to the quota number
itself. Then, the nation could choose to either accept that number of refugees within their
own borders, or pay other nation states the calculated value in exchange for taking in the
requisite number of refugees for the paying nation. This system is similar to the UN
Peacekeeping mission budget and troop allocation. The United States funds a very large
part of the budget, but sends almost no troops, instead relying on other countries to do so—
a buy out option.131 This buy out could act as the necessary valve for nations, specifically
the P5 and wealthier nations, to agree to a system in which mandated reallocation of
refugees occurred. It is essentially a nation’s veto power.132 In theory, the veto power would
be available for any nation willing to pay for it, but in reality it will only be available to
wealthier nations who already host low numbers of refugees. Consequently, a buy out
option may not completely solve the burden sharing issue, but it will still compel the
funding of other nations’ care for refugees.
Ethically, there are problems with a model that allows wealthier nations to buy out
of hosting responsibilities. First, it could commoditize refugees, a particularly vulnerable
population. Equally troubling, even if the buy out is supposed to be bookmarked for the
provision of services for refugees, there is a risk that states do not use the money for such
activities. It also takes away the autonomy of the refugee to choose where he or she would
like to settle. For example, if refugees have family in France or know of a large community
from their same ethnic group in Canada and are told that there are no spots for them there
because those countries have bought out their responsibilities, their preference is stymied.
A buy out also has the danger of perpetuating the narrative that refugees are not people
who are desirable in a particular society, which could lead to (and in fact, already has led
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to) racist rhetoric about the value of certain groups of people.133 These problems are
exemplified by the European Union’s payment to Turkey to hold refugees within Turkey’s
borders. The European Union justified the payment by designating the number of migrants
and refugees in Greece a humanitarian crisis. However, the European Union neglected to
consider the consequences of the much greater number in Turkey, a country one-seventh
the size of the European Union with $18,000 less GDP per capita.134 Holding migrants in
a country where they cannot be adequately supported poses serious concerns.
To address these ethical issues this Note makes three suggestions: a strong appeals
process, uniform implementation of post-legal services, and a powerful oversight body.
First, the centralized tribunal should have a strong appeals process for placement in a
disfavored country. On appeal, the central tribunal should grant the requested relief so long
as the refugee gives any facially legitimate answer as to why they prefer a different
placement. There should also be a strong presumption that any given answer is facially
legitimate, and therefore a strong presumption in granting requested relief. This may create
a situation in which refugee preference outpaces nations’ available spots for resettlement.
The system could try to address this issue with the second proposed suggestion.
Second, UNHCR, as a partner of the centralized tribunal, should distribute services
for refugees equitably across countries after tribunal decisions. It is important refugees feel
equally supported in their new homes. If refugees resettled in one country cannot access
the same support services as in another, the system will not work. Not only will it create a
distributional problem, with one country preferred over others, but it will also create an
equity problem for refugees assigned to nations offering less support. The funds to
supplement support in nations offering fewer services could derive from fees assessed or
buy out payments.
Third, the United Nations should create a separate body to oversee the tribunal and
its processes. The ideals of the new centralized system cannot be realized unless the
tribunal and its partners apply protection equally across refugee groups. Therefore, an
oversight body must provide a check on every aspect of the tribunal’s refugee resettlement
process. Finally, it is of paramount importance that stakeholders, namely refugees, are
given a voice in the decision-making of this oversight body, and in the decision-making
around the ethical implications of a new system in general.
Ultimately, if the ethical implications could be resolved, the right incentives to create
buy in (and not necessarily buy out) of the schema can lead to successful outcomes for
seemingly intractable global problems. Though certainly different from the refugee crisis
and its human rights implications, the international community has collaboratively
addressed climate change, another problem that requires coordinated, global action. For
example, the Montreal Protocol successfully implemented a system in which
chlorofluorocarbons were almost completely phased out by all nations involved.135 In order
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to fulfill the Montreal Protocol’s goals, four UN organs implemented and administered a
Multilateral Fund, which provided financial and technical assistance for the phaseout of
chlorofluorocarbons in developing nations.136 If the centralized tribunal for refugees used
fines to compel state action, the tribunal could put the fines into a similar fund to the
Multilateral Fund to help refugees reach self-sufficiency. Furthermore, nations’
contributions given in exchange for releasing some of their hosting duties could create a
steady pool of assets for refugee protection, which is something UNHCR does not currently
have and something the Global Compact does not adequately address.137
CONCLUSION
The global refugee crisis seems like an intractable problem. Moreover, it seems like
one that could exist in perpetuity, so long as persecution exists within nations. An overhaul
of the system is a lofty goal, unlikely to be negotiated and implemented immediately.
However, the work of the United Nations has been successful with incremental change.
For example, the United Nations held summits on climate change for thirty years, but it
was not until 2015 that an agreement between nation states became a reality.
Though the Global Compact is a lofty undertaking, and a demonstrated commitment
on behalf of UNHCR and stakeholders to address the current refugee crisis, it falls short of
real structural change capable of inciting global collaborative action. The Global Compact
leaves UNHCR with many of the same limitations it has today. UNHCR does not have
steady funding for the work it does since contributions to the agency are voluntary, and the
Global Compact does not address this shortcoming. UNHCR does not have proper
mechanisms to incentivize lesser developed countries to integrate refugees into local
society, or to incentivize more developed countries to open refugee resettlement spots. This
is why refugees like Sajad are stuck with no permanent solution. The Global Compact does
not address this shortcoming either. Though a step in the right direction, the Global
Compact adopts only vague principles without introducing fundamentally new ways to
deal with this problem.
In the future, the United Nations must take an approach that crosses over its multiple
organs to realize UNHCR’s goals for its protection mandate. A central tribunal for
refugees, created by the Security Council’s Chapter VII power, would protect refugees in
a way that UNHCR has been unable to do. With the right incentives or “veto” options, like
a buy out, the centralized scheme is a realistic approach to solving the collective global
apathy of nation states toward refugees.
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